
# CICS Security – The Basics

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April 2025









### Introduction

Leanne Wilson

Senior Security Consultant/ Technical Delivery Manager

Worked on mainframes for 13 years

Worked on many security-based projects


Also worked as an Information Security Manager concerned with GRC.





## In My Spare Time








# **OBJECTIVES**



- Learn the key security components of CICS
- Explore authentication, authorization, and auditing mechanisms
- Identify best practices for securing CICS environments

 This session will delve a little into CICS security and give you, hopefully enough information to go and understand your own CICS implementation from a security perspective






# **CICS & RACF BASICS**

# What is CICS?

- **C**ustomer Information **C**ontrol **S**ystem (CICS)
- A transaction processing system, that for some reason has become quite popular over the years, who's role is to provide online transaction processing (OLTP)
- Not the only transaction processing subsystem that IBM has:
  - IMS and Websphere and there are others
- Specialised infrastructure that supports multiple users and processes multiple application programs concurrently








CICS System

CICS Started Task

**CICS** Region

CICSPLEX – clustered version of the above






### What is CICS?

- Multi-Region Operation (MRO) within one z/OS system or Sysplex
- Single instance of CICS
- Provides interface to other systems DB2, IMS, IDMS

• First commercial release July 8th 1969










#### **Basic RACF Example**







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# **CICS SECURITY**

## The CSD (CICS System Definition)

- CICS System Definition (CSD) is a VSAM dataset where resource definitions are stored
- Access to this file and the transactions and batch utilities that manipulate and list its contents need to be strictly controlled
- The CSD is updated using transactions CEDA and CEDB
- The CSD is viewed using CEDC
- DFHCSDUP a CICS supplied batch utility can be used to list the contents of the CSD







• Defines configuration options for a CICS region

• SIT parameters govern the RACF interface







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# Systems Initialisation Table(SIT)

- Parameter settings obtained from:
  - Built-in CICS defaults
  - DFHSITxx Macro assembly modules (default DFHSIT)
  - SYSIN DD Statement
  - EXEC Statement PARM
  - Console commands; However you cannot change security parameters via the console

• Last parameter definition found is the one used





#### **Example SIT**

SIT TITLE 'DFHSIT - CICS DEFAULT SYSTEM INITIALIZATION TABLE'


DFHSIT TYPE=CSECT, VTAM APPL identifier APPLID=VRTCICS, CMDSEC=ASIS, API command security checking Default user DFLTUSER=CICSUSER, PLTPISEC=NONE, No PLT security checks on PI programs PLTPIUSR=, PLT PI userid = CICS region userid External security manager option SEC=YES, SECPRFX=NO, Security prefix USRDELAY=30 Delay before ACEE refresh XCMD=YES, Use default RACF class name XDCT=NO, Do not perform RACF check XFCT=\$UKFCT, FCT use UK class for RACF check XJCT=NO, Do not perform RACF check XPCT=YES, Use default RACF class name Use default RACF class name XPPT=YES, Use default RACF class name XPSB=YES, XTRAN=YES, Use default RACF class name XUSER=YES Surrogate user checking to be done

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#### What the ESM does for us?

- CICS relies on an ESM (RACF, ACF2 or TSS) to provide security
  - The ESM controls
    - Who can logon to CICS
    - Who can execute a transaction
    - Who can use a transaction resource
      - Started Transaction
      - Program, File or Journal
      - Transient Data Destination
      - Temporary Storage Queue
    - Who can execute a CICS command (CMDSEC)






### **CICS and External Security**

• CICS when configured to do so will call an External Security Manager (ESM)

• The ESM can be RACF, CA-ACF/2 or CA-Top Secret


• CICS has no mechanism today for internal security

• If you don't use an ESM, you have NO security!





#### **The CICS RACF Interface**





# The role of CICS in security control

- To invoke SAF via RACROUTE to perform:
  - User Signon/Signoff
  - Access Authorisation







• The SIT as previously mentioned is where most of the good stuff happens!

• We must understand this in detail and all the parameters that are here!

• You need to strictly control the SIT

• Some environments control it using Endevor, ISPW or Change man





#### **SIT Parms**

APPLID=(VRTCICS),

FCT=NO,

GMTEXT= 'Vertali CICS SYSTEM',

GRPLIST=(XYZLIST,CICSTS32) ,

IRCSTRT=YES,

ISC=YES, STATRCD=ON, SEC=NO, TCT=NO, TRTABSZ=64, XRF=NO

So what's the problem

with these

parameters?


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## Is security being used?

- SEC=NO
  - No External Security Manager being used


- SEC=YES
  - External Security Manager is being used





# What is being protected?

- Controlled by several other parameters in sit in the form Xnnnn=
- Where:
  - XTRAN = Transaction Security
  - XFCT = File Control Security
  - XCMD = Command Security
  - XTST = CICS Temp. storage control
  - XPCT = Started Transaction control
  - To name but a few!






#### **Xnnn SIT Parameters**

- The majority of the Xnnn SIT parameters follow the form:
  - NO
    - Option is disabled
  - YES
    - Option is enabled with default IBM RACF classes

#### Class\_name

 The installation has created a site specific RACF class, normally a pair member & grouping





# What controls are available to protect the data?

#### **Transaction security - XTRAN**

Always configure CICS regions to use transaction security. However, transaction security is in effect a form of boundary checking. Therefore, it's not sufficient for a zero trust strategy on its own. Unless additional controls are applied, a transaction can access any resource in the CICS region.

#### **Resource security - RESSEC**

Transaction security is not sufficient for a zero trust strategy on its own. It is recommended that you use resource security to protect data that is accessed by an application for an additional layer of security. Enable resource security for all classes of resources that you need to

protect

#### **Command security - CMDSEC**

System programming interface (SPI) commands can be used to manage the CICS system and its resources. It is recommended that you use command security to control who is allowed to issue the commands.




# CICS TRANSACTION SECURITY

#### **XTRAN SIT Parameter**

- If XTRAN=YES
  - then the IBM supplied RACF classes TCICSTRN & GCICSTRN are being used for transaction security

- If XTRAN=£PRDTRN
  - then the site defined RACF classes T£PRDTRN & G£PRDTRN RACF classes are being used for transaction security
  - Note that CICS enforces the first character of the RACF class for transaction profiles to be a T
  - Other resource types have their own rules






### **Transaction Profiles and Classes**


• You have some choices....

- Do I want to use the standard IBM classes TCICSTRN and GCICSTRN?
- Do I want to create my own classes?
- Do I want the profiles prefixed?





- Share default classes among CICS regions
  - TCICSTRN and GCICSTRN shared between CICSPRD1, CICSPRD2 and CICSPRD3
  - Would all have XTRAN=YES defined in their respective SIT's
  - SECPRFX=NO
  - They could even be sharing the same SIT parameter dataset





- Create locally defined independent classes for each region or set of related regions (Prod, Dev, Test, etc)
  - Eg T£PRDTRN and G£PRDTRN shared between CICSPRD1, CICSPRD2 and CICSPRD3
  - Eg T£DEVTRN and G£DEVTRN shared between CICSDEV1, CICSDEV2 and CICSDEV3
  - Would all have XTRAN=£PRDTRN / XTRAN=£DEVTRN set in their SIT
  - SECPRFX=NO





- Classes shared by dissimilar CICS regions
  - May need to differentiate resources belonging to specific CICS regions
  - Resource names can be prefixed with CICS region's USERID or Prefix
  - SIT Parameter SECPRFX=YES | <u>NO</u> | *Prefix*
- CEMT in Prod needs to be locked down; but available in Dev
  - Prod userid is **PRODCICS** and Dev is **DEVCICS**
  - Two RACF profiles **PRODCICS.CEMT** and **DEVCICS.CEMT**






- TCICSTRN and GCICSTRN shared between CICSPRD1 and CICSDEV1
- Would have XTRAN=YES defined in their respective SIT's
- SECPRFX=YES








#### **My Recommendation**

- I would always go with separate RACF classes and not use prefixing
- It's easy now that we have the RACF CDT class
- But ultimately, you must do what is best for your organisation








### What RACF profiles do I have?

- Use the RACF SEARCH command to list all of the profiles in a given class:
  - SR CLASS(TCICSTRN) NOMASK
  - SR CLASS(GCICSTRN) NOMASK

• This only shows the profiles






#### Who has access to them?

- You need to list each profile and check:
  - UACC
  - Access List
  - Conditional Access List

You can generate the required RACF commands with the SEARCH command and CLIST option






#### Search Command – CLIST Option

SEARCH XXX. XXX

CLIST ('string1' 'string2')







#### **Example Search in batch**

//SEARCH EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01

//SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=\*

//SYSTSIN DD \*

SR CLASS (TCICSTRN) NOMASK NOLIST -

CLIST('RL TCICSTRN ' ' ALL')


//\*

//EXEC EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01

//SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=\*

//SYSTSIN DD \*

EX EXEC.RACF.CLIST






### **CICS Transaction Security**

• IBM supply many transactions as part of the basic CICS install

• They are categorised and all have different security requirements










- CICS Internal use only
- Never associated with a terminal
- RACF (ESM) is NOT called for these transactions
- Some people define them to RACF for documentation purposes










- CICS Administration transactions
- Very powerful
- Very restricted access lists



- All RACF profiles should have a UACC of NONE
- May be a good candidate for AUDIT(ALL(READ)) to log all access successful or not
- Check the manuals carefully there are additional security requirements/suggestions







- All users require access to these transactions
- All Category 3 transactions are exempt from security checks
- Some people define them to RACF for documentation purposes





# MEMBER AND GROUPING CLASSES

#### **A PAIR OF CLASSES**

• Member Class and a Grouping Class




#### **RACF CLASS NAMES**

Member class	Resource grouping class	Description
TCICSTRN	GCICSTRN	CICS transactions, normal attach security
PCICSPSB	QCICSPSB	CICS PSBs
ACICSPCT	BCICSPCT	CICS-started transactions
DCICSDCT	ECICSDCT	CICS transient data queues
FCICSFCT	HCICSFCT	CICS files
JCICSJCT	KCICSJCT	CICS journals
MCICSPPT	NCICSPPT	CICS programs
SCICSTST	UCICSTST	CICS temporary storage queues
CCICSCMD	VCICSCMD	EXEC CICS SYSTEM commands
RCICSRES	WCICSRES	Document templates, bundles, EP adapters, EP adapter sets, event bindings, ATOMSERVICE definitions, and XML transforms

## Member or Grouping Class?

- What are they?
- Two different ways to protect resources in CICS
- How does CICS use them?
  - Profile merge
  - In Storage profiles
- Who has access?






### **Example of Member Class Profiles**

 The warehouse group of users need access to three transactions: INVC, ORDP & STOH

RDEFINE	TCIC	STRN	INVC	OWNER	(SECADM)	UACC	(NONE)
RDEFINE	TCIC	STRN	ORDP	OWNER	(SECADM)	UACC	(NONE)
RDEFINE	TCIC	STRN	STOH	OWNER	(SECADM)	UACC	(NONE)
PERMIT	INVC	CLAS	S(TCIC	STRN)	ID(WHSEU	SRS)	ACCESS (READ)
PERMIT	ORDP	CLAS	S(TCIC	STRN)	ID(WHSEU	SRS)	ACCESS (READ)
PERMIT	STOH	CLAS	S(TCIC	STRN)	ID(WHSEU	SRS)	ACCESS (READ)




#### **Example Grouping Class Profiles**

 The warehouse group of users need access to three transactions: INVC, ORDP & STOH

RDEFINE GCICSTRN WARE\_TRNS OWNER(SECADM) UACC(NONE) RALTER GCICSTRN WARE TRNS ADDMEM(INVC ORDP STOH)

PERMIT WARE TRNS CLASS(GCICSTRN) ID(WHSEUSRS) ACCESS(READ)





#### **How RACF merges Profiles**

- Member / grouping classes must be loaded into memory
- Applies only to member / grouping classes
- Merge applies only if a resource name appears in more than one profile
- UACC: The most restrictive UACC is chosen from the profiles that are merged
- Access list: If a user or group appears in the access lists of multiple profiles, that user or group is given the highest access





# **OTHER BITS**

### **User Logon at Terminal**

- RACF logon
  - CESN sign-on transaction
  - Program with EXEC CICS SIGNON command
  - CICS Supports MFA, just saying


- APPL applid as determine by SIT parameters
  - APPLID= Region's application ID
  - READ access required





### **User Logon at Terminal**


- CICS concurrent logon restrictions
  - SNSCOPE=NONE | CICS | MVSIMAGE | SYSPLEX
    - NONE No restriction
    - CICS Only once in each CICS region
    - MVSIMAGE Only once for entire MVS image
    - SYSPLEX Only once for entire Sysplex
- Only effects user logon via CESN
- Does not affect pre-set terminal logons





# **Auditing CICS**

- SMF 1154 subtype 80 records from CICS
- IBM Healthchecker
- Review CICS job logs
- Issued SPI Commands
- Auditing RACF CICS resources
  - Profiles
  - ACLS
  - Audit settings





# Thank You



