## **IMS Version 15**

# IMS 15 -Pervasive Encryption and IMS

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#### Data protection and compliance are business imperatives

"It's no longer a matter of if, but when ..."



Likelihood of an organization having a data breach in the next 24 months <sup>1</sup> European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)



Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS)



Average cost of a data breach in 2016<sup>2</sup>



only **4%** were encrypted <sup>3</sup>

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)



1, 2Source: 2016 Ponemon Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis --

http://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach/

3 Source: Breach Level Index -- <u>http://breachlevelindex.com/</u>



# "It's not a matter of if, but when."

- Regulatory Compliance
- Industry standards
- Customer satisfaction
- Many data breaches occur without immediate knowledge.
- 2016 Average time to breach discovery 191 days \*
- Discovery of a breach may be *much* later.

## There are No "do overs"

\* Ponemon/IBM 2017 report

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# Pervasive Encryption with IBM z Systems

Enabled through tight platform integration

Network Encryption	ိုင်္	Protect network traffic using standards based encryption from end to end, including encryption readiness technology <sup>2</sup> to ensure that z/OS systems meet approved encryption
Data Set & File Encryption	Ø	criteria Protect Linux file systems and z/OS data sets <sup>1</sup> using policy controlled encryption that is transparent to applications and databases
Coupling Facility	Ō	Protect z/OS Coupling Facility <sup>2</sup> data end-to-end, using encryption that's transparent to applications
Secure Service Container		Secure deployment of software appliances including tamper protection during installation and runtime, restricted administrator access, and encryption of data and code in-flight and
tegrated Crypto Hardware		at-rest Hardware accelerated encryption on every core – CPACF PCIe Hardware Security Module (HSM) & Cryptographic Coprocessor – Crypto Express5S
		And we have been a structure of the second

And we're just getting started ...


- 1 Statement of Direction\* in the z/OS Announcement Letter (10/4/2016) http://ibm.co/2ldwKoC
- 2 IBM z/OS Version 2 Release 3 Preview Announcement Letter (2/21/2017) http://ibm.co/2l43ctN
  - \* All statements regarding IBM's future direction and intent are subject to change or withdrawal without notice, and represent goals and objectives only.



## **Topics**

Levels of Encryption depend on where the data needs to be encrypted


Implementation depends on resources and expected results





## **Encryption Algorithms**


- DES (Data Encryption Standard)
  - 56-bit, viewed as weak and generally unacceptable today





# **Encryption Algorithms**

- TDES (Triple Data Encryption Standard)
  - 128-bit, accepted algorithm




Note: same key can be used for each step for DES compatibility



## **Encryption Algorithms**

- (Advanced Encryption Standard)
  - 128-, 192- or 256- bit, commercially used algorithm



#### **Rijndael Algorithm**

- Block Cipher (16-byte blocks)
- 128, 192, 256-bit Key Length
- Multiple Rounds
- Four Steps per Round Byte Substitution Shift Row Mix Column Add Round Key



# Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility (ICSF)

- Provides: z/OS integrated software support for data encryption
- Operating System S/W API Interface to Cryptographic Hardware
  - CEX2/3C hardware feature for z114, z10 and z196
  - CEX4S hardware feature for z12BC and z12EC
  - CEX5S hardware feature for z13 (2x faster over CEX4S)
  - CEX6S hardware feature for z14 (5x plus faster over CEX5S)
- Enhanced Key Management for key creation and distribution
  - Public and private keys, Secure and clear keys, Master keys
- Created keys are stored/accessed in the Cryptographic Key Data Set (CKDS) with unique key label
- CKDS itself is secured via Security Access Facility



## What are Encryption Keys?

#### Master Keys

- Used to generate, encrypt, and store user keys into the CKDS (Cryptographic Key Data Set)
- Loaded into the CEXnn hardware, and stored NO WHERE else
- User Keys (Data Encrypting Keys)
  - Generated via ICSF services
  - Stored inside the CKDS
  - Public or Private
  - Clear or Secure
  - Used by the IBM InfoSphere GDEz Encryption Tool along with encryption algorithm to convert user data to Ciphertext for Database Encryption



# **Encryption Keys**

#### Clear Key

- Key is exposed in the storage of processor
- Can be viewed in dump of storage
- If correctly interpreted can expose data
- Sometimes acceptable for short-lived keys with other constraints
- Used in software-based cryptography
- Used by CPACF
- CEXn hardware not required

#### Secure Key

- Key is only ever exposed in bounds of a secure processor
- Can never be seen in storage
- Dump will not reveal key
- Key is held encrypted under Master key
- Crypto Express 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
- APIs available via Integrated
   Cryptographic Support Facility (ICSF)
- Can be used from Java on z/OS platform



## **Encryption Keys**

- Clear Key vs. Secure Key Performance
  - Clear key elapsed time performance is **MUCH** superior than Secure key for Database Encryption
  - Secure key (performed inside the CEX) is generally viewed as more secure from a cryptographic perspective
  - Clear key uses special instructions that run on the current general purpose processors, so performance is measured in microseconds
  - Secure key encryption is dispatched to run on the cryptographic coprocessors on the CEXnC crypto feature. This tends to be measured in milliseconds as this is essentially an I/O operation.
  - Secure key elapsed time measurements (depending on workload and SQL/DLI type) can be from 10x to 40x more than clear key
  - Secure key is probably NOT appropriate for most OLTP workloads, but each customer needs to make this encryption decision based on their security requirements and performance expectations



## **Encryption Keys**

- Clear Key vs. Secure Key Performance
- Protected Key
  - A Secure Key wrapped in encryption moved from the hardware
  - Reduces I/O type calls
  - Obscures Secure Key in memory as an encrypted object
  - Performance improvement over Secure Key
  - Greatest benefit for bulk processing against database

#### **IMS** Version 15



## **Application encryption**



Data protection & privacy provided and managed by the application... encryption of sensitive data when lower levels of encryption not available or suitable

- Requires changes to applications to implement and maintain
- Highly granular
- Protect data right up to the point where it will be used
- Applications must be responsible for key management
- Appropriate for selective encryption of hyper-sensitive data



## Application encryption

#### **Db2 Built-In Functions**

- Under application control you encrypt the fields that need to be secure
  - 'Password for Encryption' is hashed to generate a unique key
  - Hint can be used as a prompt for remembering the key
  - Encrypted field must be defined as VARCHAR (since it will contain binary data once its encrypted)
  - The encrypted field will be longer (next multiple of 8 bytes + 24 bytes of MetaData + 32 bytes for optional hint field)
  - TDES Only!

Encrypt (StringDataToEncrypt, PasswordOrPhrase, PasswordHint) Decrypt\_Char(EncryptedData, PasswordOrPhrase



## **Application Encryption**

#### **Db2 Built-In Functions Example**

CREATE TABLE EMPL (EMPNO VARCHAR(64) FOR BIT DATA, EMPNAME CHAR(20), CITY CHAR(20), SALARY DECIMAL(9,2)) IN DSNDB04.RAMATEST ;

COMMIT; SET ENCRYPTION PASSWORD = 'PEEKAY' WITH HINT 'ROTTIE'; INSERT INTO EMPL(EMPNO, EMPNAME, SALARY) VALUES (ENCRYPT('123456'), 'PAOLO BRUNI', 20000.00) ;

```
INSERT INTO EMPL(EMPNO, EMPNAME, SALARY) VALUES (ENCRYPT('123457'),'ERNIE
MANCILL',20000.00) ;
```

Bypasses Separation of Duty

DBA or Programmer, maybe user, must know password Encryption Algorithm is limited –TDES only

From Redbook SG24-7959, Security Functions of IBM Db2 10 for z/OS



## DATABASE ENCRYPTION

Database Encryption Provide protection for very sensitive inuse (DB level), in-flight & at-rest data Granular protection & privacy managed by database processes... selective encryption & granular key management control of sensitive data

- Encrypts sensitive data at the Db2 row and column levels and IMS segment level
- Transparent to applications
- Separation of Duties (SOD) and granular access control
- Protects Data-In-Use within memory buffers
- Clear text data cannot be accessed outside DBMS access methods
- Persists the encrypted sensitive data in logs, image copy data sets, DASD volume backups
- Utilizes IBM z Systems integrated cryptographic hardware



**IBM GDEz Data Encryption for Db2 and IMS Databases** 

- A Single tool for both Db2 and IMS
- Data Encryption addresses the increased demand for data privacy and security
- Performs encryption and decryption through the use of exit routines.
- Leverages the System z®, zSeries®, and S/390® Crypto Hardware to encrypt data
- Protects sensitive data that can reside on various storage media
  - Db2 and IMS databases
  - Image copy datasets
  - DASD volume backups
- Data is protected in DBMS buffers
- Does not bypass or preclude other encryption processes




## Features and Benefits

- Enables compliance with privacy and security regulations
- Customization to Db2 column level and at the IMS segment level
- Straightforward implementation using defined key labels
- Ensures data privacy by encrypting and decrypting data
- Requires no changes to your applications
- Conforms to the existing z/OS and OS/390<sup>®</sup> security model
- Provides an ISPF front end to create and customize encryption exit routines
- Enables you to leverage the power of Storage Area Networks (SANs) safely while complying with privacy and security regulations
- Uses the following standard encryption algorithms:
  - ANSI Data Encryption Algorithm (DES), known as the Data Encryption Standard (DES)
  - Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDES), known as the Triple Data Encryption Standard (Triple DES)
  - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) \*




#### **IMS Encryption Flow**



#### Encryption

- IMS application program passes a segment REPL, ISRT, or LOAD request to the IMS control region. IMS uses the DBD to determine that a Segment Edit/Compression exit is required, so IMS loads the exit.
- 2. Exit invokes ICSF services, passing user-defined data encryption key label (provided by exit) and unencrypted segment.
- 3. When the segment has been successfully encrypted, the exit passes the segment back to IMS.
- 4. IMS then puts the encrypted segment into the database

#### **IMS Decryption Flow**



#### Decryption

- 1. IMS application program passes segment GET request to IMS control region. IMS determines, from DBD, that a Segment Edit/Compression exit is required, so IMS loads the exit.
- 2. IMS retrieves encrypted segment from the database.
- IMS then calls the exit and passes it the encrypted segment. The exit invokes ICSF services, which passes the user-defined data encryption key label (provided by exit) and the encrypted segment.
- 4. When the segment has been successfully decrypted, the exit passes the segment back to IMS.
- 5. IMS passes the decrypted segment back to the application.



## **IMS RESTRICTIONS**

- An IMS segment is only associated with a single Segment Edit / Compression / encryption exit
  - An encryption exit may be associated with multiple segments
- An IMS segment with an existing segment exit should use a driver that ensures the correct call order e.g. Compress <u>before</u> Encryption
- HIDAM indexes cannot be encrypted using database encryption
  - IMS restriction



#### **IMS CONSIDERATIONS**

- ICSF initialize with CHECKAUTH = NO
  - These options set to YES invoke extended path length
- A separate segment Edit / Compression exit needs to be built for each separate cryptographic key label
- A single key label may be used for multiple segments
- APF authorize the dataset containing the segment edit routines
- IMS loads the segment Edit / Compression routines below the 16M line
  - Be aware of storage use
- IMS databases allocated using OSAM dataset currently are encrypted ONLY by Guardium



## **Data Set Encryption**

- Enabled by policy
- Transparent to applications

- Tied to access control
- Uses protected encryption keys managed by the host

File or Data Set Level Encryption


Provide **broad** coverage for sensitive data using encryption tied to access control for in-flight & at-rest data protection Broad protection & privacy managed by OS... ability to eliminate storage admins from compliance scope

- Broadly encrypt data at rest
- Covers VSAM, Db2, IMS, Middleware, Logs, Batch, & ISV solutions<sup>1</sup>
- Encrypt in bulk for low-overhead
- Utilizes IBM z Systems integrated cryptographic hardware



# 8

## z/OS Data Set Encryption: No Application Changes Required






## z/OS Data Set Encryption: Encryption By Policy

A data set is defined as 'encrypted' when a **key label** is supplied either on or prior to allocation of a **new** sequential or VSAM extended format data set.

The preferred method of enabling data set encryption is to specify a key label in the DFP segment of the RACF Data Set profile.

```
ALTDSD "PROJECTA.DATA.*' UACC(NONE)
DFP(RESOWNER(ALICE) DATAKEY(key-label))
```

In the following example, Alice can read and update the data set. Bob can read the data set. Eve can read, update, delete, rename, move, or scratch the data set. But what content will they see?









Any user that needs access to the data set content in the clear must have access to the key label.

```
RDEFINE CSFKEYS * UACC(NONE)

RDEFINE CSFKEYS key-label UACC(NONE)

PERMIT key-label CLASS(CSFKEYS) ID(ALICE)

ACCESS(READ)

PERMIT key-label CLASS(CSFKEYS) ID(BOB)

ACCESS(READ)WHEN(CRITERIA(SMS(DSENCRYPTION))

PERMIT key-label CLASS(CSFKEYS) ID(EVE)

ACCESS(NONE)
```

In this example, Alice and Bob have access to the key label. So, they can view the data set contents in the clear. Eve has no access to the key label. So, even though she has UPDATE authority to manage the data set, she cannot view its contents.





## Hardware encryption

- Protects at the DASD subsystem level
- All or nothing encryption
- Only data at rest is encrypted
- · Single encryption key for everything

- No application overhead
- Zero host CPU cost
- Prevents exposures on: Disk removal, Box removal, File removal

**Full Disk & Tape Encryption** Provide 100% coverage for data at-rest with **zero** host CPU cost Protection against intrusion, tamper or removal of *physical* infrastructure



## Hardware Encryption

Full Disk & Tape Encryption

#### DS8000 Manages the Complexity for You

• Most of the activity discussed above is managed transparently for the user once encryption is enabled and configured

• Encryption-related functions can all be handled through the DS8000 GUI or CLI

Storage Encryption configuration is really about authentication and separation of duties – the actual encryption is already happening inside the drives



## Hardware Encryption

#### Full Disk & Tape Encryption Authentication Keys

The FDE drives leave manufacturing in the unlocked state, so that all the disk operations are enabled, by default. In order to protect the data (to limit the read/write access), you can activate the locking mechanism by establishing new *authentication key*.

This key wraps (encodes) the encryption key. Therefore, from that point forward, the authentication key must be provided to the drive so that the drive can unwrap its encryption key for encoding and decoding the data transfer. The authentication key must be stored outside of the drive, available only for authorized systems. When the drive is powered off, it forgets its state, so it becomes locked. Every access request is denied while it is in locked state.

The proper authentication key is needed to unlock the drive temporarily. If the authentication process succeeds, client data can be accessed without any limitations until the next power loss.

#### Note:

The authentication key must be stored in a *safe* and *reliable* place. Unauthorized access to the key undermines the FDE security. The authentication key must be available continuously in order to unlock the drive whenever it is necessary. Losing all the copies of the authentication key yields to permanent data loss.

## IBM

# Hardware Encryption


#### Full Disk & Tape Encryption

Protection against intrusion, tamper or removal of *physical* infrastructure

- Data is always encrypted on write to the drive and then decrypted on read
  - Data stored on the drive is encrypted
  - Customer data in flight is not encrypted
- Drives do the encryption at full data read/write rate
  - No impact to disk response times
  - Uses AES 256 bit encryption
- Supports cryptographic erasure data
  - Change of encryption keys
- Requires authentication with key server before access to data is granted
  - Key management is via IBM Security Key Lifecycle Manager (SKLM)
  - z/OS can also use IBM Security Key Lifecycle Manager (ISKLM)
  - Key exchange with key server is via 256 bit encryption
- Key attack methods addressed
  - Protection for disk removal (repair, replace or stolen)
  - Protection for disk subsystem removal (retired, replaced or stolen)




#### **Hardware Level**






#### **Dataset Level**






#### **Database Level**

Clear data





#### **Application Level**





## Encryption

Encrypted	Application	Database	Dataset	Disc
At rest	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
At Input / Output	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
In memory buffer	Yes	Yes	No	No
In Application program	Yes	No	No	No
Application Transparent	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
User transparent	Maybe	Yes	Yes	Yes
Maintenance Degree of Difficulty	High	Medium	Medium	Medium
Implementation Degree of Difficulty	High	Medium	Medium	Low

IMS Version 15



## **Encryption - IMS**

#### **IMS and Dataset Encryption**

- Datasets used by IMS that are supported
- Datasets used by IMS that are <u>not</u> supported
- Datasets that exist will not be encrypted just by defining it so



### **Encryption - IMS**

#### The following IMS V15 data sets supported in the DFSMS data set encryption:

Data Set Type	Notes	Address Space Userids Needing Key Label Access*
Database: VSAM (HALDB, non- HALDB)	Extended addressability attribute not supported for VSAM DBs.	CTL, DLI, batch jobs, utilities accessing DB
Database: DEDB	Added with APAR PI83756 PTF UI53418	CTL, DLI, batch jobs, utilities accessing DB
WADS (DFSWADSn)	VSAM Linear dataset. Must be allocated in Extended Format	CTL (including XRF alternate, FDBR regions), log archive utility, other utilities accessing OLDS, RSR transport manager
Online log data sets (DFSOLPnn, DFSOLSnn)		CTL (including XRF alternate, FDBR regions), log archive utility, other utilities accessing OLDS, RSR transport manager
Batch log data sets		CTL (including XRF alternate, FDBR regions), log archive utility, other utilities accessing OLDS, RSR transport manager
SLDS / RLDS		IMS batch jobs, utilities accessing batch logs, RSR transport manager



## **Encryption - IMS**

#### The following IMS V15 data sets supported in the DFSMS data set encryption (cont):

Data Set Type	Notes	Address Space Userids Needing Key Label Access*
Change Accum data sets	Change accumulation utility, DB recovery utilities	Change Accumulation data sets
Image copy data sets	Image copy utilities, DB recovery utilities	Image copy data sets
CQS SRDS		CQS
IMS Connect Recorder Trace		IMS Connect, utilities that process IMS recorder trace
BPE Trace data sets	Need to use RACF rules or DATACLAS with key label. Key label is not supported by BPE EXTTRACE statement.	Address spaces that use BPE, utilities that process BPE trace data (including IPCS TSO users)
z/OS log stream offload and staging data sets	Dependent on z/OS logger encryption support	z/OS logger address



## **Encryption - IMS**

#### Encryption is explicitly *not* supported for the following IMS V15 data sets:

Data Set Type	Notes
Database: OSAM	EXCP / custom channel program; cannot be extended format
MSDB data sets	IBM has recommended MSDBs be converted to DEDBs for the last 10 IMS releases.
Queue manager data sets (LGMSG, SHMSG, QBLKS)	Uses OSAM
Restart data set (RDS)	Uses OSAM
All PDS / PDSE type data sets (PSBLIB, DBDLIB, ACBLIB, MODBLKS, FMTLIB, IMSTFMTx, IMSDALIB, program libraries, PROCLIB/configuration data sets, catalog directory, staging, BSDS)	DFSMS does not support PDS/PDSE encryption
Spool data sets	EXCP / custom channel program; cannot be extended format



DFSMS data set encryption is established for a given data set when that data set is created and has a key label associated with it. Encrypted data sets must be extended format. Key labels can be specified for a data set by:

- 1. Creating RACF rules that associate a key label with a data set name pattern, via the DATAKEY parameter of the DFP segment.
- 2. Specifying a key label directly on JCL, dynamic allocation, TSO allocate, or IDCAMS DEFINE
- 3. Using a DATACLAS with a key label associated with it

Existing (already created) data sets that are not encrypted do not become encrypted just because their DATACLAS has a key label added to it, or because a RACF rule associates a key label with the data set. Existing data sets must be copied into a new extended format data set defined with a key label to become encrypted.

## **DFSMS Data Set Encryption**

- Data sets are defined as encrypted by specifying a key label at the *creation* of a new data set:
  - SAF data set profile: Rules that associate a key label with a data set name pattern, via new DATAKEY parameter of the DFP RACF segment.
  - JCL, dynamic allocation, or TSO allocate (new **DSKEYLBL** parameter)
  - IDCAMS DEFINE (new KEYLABEL parameter)
  - SMS DATACLAS (new key label attribute)
- Application transparency: Data is encrypted/decrypted when accessed via supported access methods:
  - Data encryption/decryption occurs as data is written to or read from disk.
  - In-memory system or application data buffers remain in the clear.
  - Data remains encrypted during backup/recovery, migration/recall, and replication.
  - Access to key label is controlled through SAF permissions, in addition to traditional data set permissions.
- Programs accessing data sets using other access methods (Media Manager, direct channel programs) cannot access data sets encrypted by DFSMS without modification.





#### Full Function VSAM Database Data Sets (non-HALDB, or not OLR-capable):

- 1. Preallocate the new database data sets with appropriate key labels
- 2. Take the database offline: e.g., /DBR DB, UPDATE DB STOP(ACCESS)
- 3. Run the appropriate unload utility (DFSURUL0 or DFSURGU0) or tool
- 4. Run the appropriate reload utility (DFSURRL0 or DFSURGL0) or tool to reload the database into the encrypted data sets

Note: that if prefix resolution is required, the sort that is done will create temporary work data sets that are not encrypted. DFSMS does not support sort work data sets as extended format.

- 5. Rename the old data sets to a backup name
- 6. Rename the new data sets to the correct database data set names
- 7. Bring the database online: e.g., /STA DB, UPDATE DB START(ACCESS)

You may also be able to use a separate online reorg product to perform a database reorganization without taking the database offline. Consult your online reorg tool documentation for details.



# What to Expect if a the USERID of an Address Space is Not Authorized to a Key Label

In general OPEN will fail for the data set in question, so the IMS behavior should be no different than if any other type of OPEN failure occurs. You would expect to see an IEC1611 (open failure) and a RACF authorization failure like:

```
IEC161I data_set_name,,VCATSHR
ICH408I USER(OMVSADM ) GROUP(SYS1 ) NAME(OMVS ) 872 key_label
CL(CSFKEYS )
INSUFFICIENT ACCESS AUTHORITY
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )
```

followed by whatever error message the process deems appropriate for the open failure.



# **Encryption Implementation Considerations**

- Application
  - Application logic determines which key to use for each field/column
  - Password is managed by the application
- Data Administrator Data Encryption Tool
  - Sets up the EDITPROC and specifies the key to be used for the entire table Db2
  - Sets up the COMPRTN and specifies the key for encrypted segments IMS
  - Key must be defined to/managed by ICSF (stored in the CKDS)
- Security requirements
- Performance requirements
  - Single transaction vs bulk processes
- Application/production support
- Space considerations
- Crypto hardware available



# **Encryption Implementation Considerations**

- Not insignificant
  - Multiple points of implementation
- May require multiple groups to coordinate
  - Security
  - Storage
  - System programmer
- Have a back up / back out plan









#### Full Function VSAM Database Data Sets (HALDB, OLR capable):

Either use the offline process as described above for non-HALDB, or use HALDB Online Reorg to reorganize the unencrypted data set into an encrypted data set:

- 1. Preallocate the new OLR target database data sets with appropriate key labels.
- 2. Run IMS online reorg for one or more partitions. Repeat until all of the partitions are reorganized.



Encrypting the Write Ahead Data Set (WADS)

The WADS can be encrypted across a restart of IMS or while IMS remains up. The steps for each procedure are outlined below. Note that IMS can use up to 10 WADS, numbered 0-9

If different data set names are used for the encrypted and non-encrypted WADS, and MDA is not used for the WADS data set names (that is, there are DD statements in the control region JCL for the WADS), then IMS must be recycled to perform this migration.

This is because the online control region will have the WADS allocated and they will be unable to be deleted while IMS remains up.



Encrypting the Write Ahead Data Set (WADS)

Allocating for Using Encryption

```
DEFINE CLUSTER -
(NAME(data set name) -
CONTROLINTERVALSIZE(4096) -
SHAREOPTIONS(3 3) -
CYL(200) -
DATACLAS(dataclas) -
STORCLAS(storclas) -
KEYLABEL(keylabel) -
LINEAR)
```

Keylabel is the label for the encryption key

**IMS Version 15** 



**Database Encryption** 

# **APPENDIX**





Encrypting the Write Ahead Data Set (WADS)

Procedure if IMS is to come down for migration:

- 1. Ensure that IMS comes down cleanly
- 2. Delete all WADS
- 3. Define all new WADS as extended format and with a key label.
  - a) If different data set names are being used for the encrypted WADS, this is the point where the MDA members are to be updated or the DD statements in the control region JCL are to be changed.
- 4. Cold start IMS, specifying "FMT WA" or "FMT ALL" on the /NRESTART command.



Encrypting the Write Ahead Data Set (WADS)

Procedure for keeping IMS up during the migration:

- 1. Issue /DIS OLDS to see which WADS are in use
- 2. Issue a "/STO WADS x" command for each WADS that's not in use
- 3. Delete all of the WADS just stopped and define them as extended format and with a key label.
  - a) If different data set names are being used for the encrypted WADS, this is the point where the MDA members are to be updated.
- 4. Issue "/STA WADS x" for each WADS just delete/defined.

Note: WADS are formatted as part of /STA WADS processing

- 5. Issue /SWI WADS
- 6. Issue "/STO WADS x" for the WADS that were just switched from.
- 7. Note: If using dual WADS, this command will need to be issued for each WADS just switched from.
- 8. Delete/define the WADS just switched from as extended format and with a key label.
  - a) If different data set names are being used for the encrypted WADS, this is the point where the MDA members are to be updated.
- 9. Issue "/STA WADS x" for the WADS just delete/defined.



#### Online Log Data Sets (OLDS):

Use the following steps to convert to encrypted OLDS when you can shut down IMS and restart it across the conversion.

Note that you must use this approach if your OLDS are specified as DD statements in your IMS control region JCL: i.e., are not dynamically allocated:

- 1. Create a new set of encrypted OLDS with key labels one OLDS for each existing OLDS in the set used by IMS..
- 2. Pre-format each new OLDS data sets. One way to do this is to copy an existing full OLDS into one of your new encrypted OLDS data sets. Then, use that copy to copy into all of your other new OLDS. This ensures that all blocks in the new OLDS are initialized.
- 3. If IMS is active, issue /CHE FREEZE and ensure that IMS comes down clean. Ensure that all log archive jobs complete successfully.
- 4. Remove the PRIOLD/SECOLD entries from DBRC using the DSPURX00 utility.
- 5. Rename the original OLDS data sets to a backup name, and rename the new encrypted OLDS to the original OLDS data set names.

Warm starting IMS (restart will use the SLDS).

6. You can delete the old OLDS data sets once you have completed the migration and have confirmed all is operating correctly.



If IMS is active and you want to enable encryption for the OLDS without stopping and restarting IMS, you can either migrate one OLDS at a time, or, if you are using 50 or fewer OLDS, you can migrate from one "set" of unencrypted OLDS to a new "set" of encrypted OLDS.

Note that both of these sequences require the use of dynamic allocation for your OLDS data sets. You cannot migrate OLDS to be encrypted while IMS is active if there are DD statements in the control region JCL for the OLDS. This is because the procedure deletes or renames the old data sets and this will fail if the control region has an OLDS allocated.



To migrate one OLDS at a time while IMS is active:

- Create a new set of encrypted OLDS with key labels one OLDS for each existing OLDS in the set used by IMS. The new OLDS should be the same attributes as the current OLDS. They <u>must</u> be allocated as extended format datasets.
- 2. Pre-format each new OLDS data sets:
- 3. One way to do this is to copy an existing full OLDS into one of your new encrypted OLDS data sets. Then, use that copy to copy into all of your other new OLDS. This ensures that all blocks in the new OLDS are initialized.
- Either wait until a current OLDS fills and IMS switches to the next OLDS, or issue a /SWI OLDS command to force an immediate switch. Then, for the OLDS that you switched from:
  - 1. Wait until log archiving completes for the switched-from OLDS.
  - 2. Issue the **/STO OLDS nn** command for the switched-from OLDS.
  - 3. Delete the OLDS from DBRC by removing the PRIOLD/SECOLD entries using DSPURX00 utility or online command.
  - 4. Rename the old OLDS data set to another name. Do this for both the primary and secondary "switched-from" OLDS if you are using dual OLDS logging.
  - 5. Rename the new encrypted OLDS data set to the old OLDS data set name. Do this for both the primary and secondary OLDS if you are using dual OLDS logging.
  - 6. Issue a /STA OLDS nn command to start using the encrypted OLDS.
- 5. Repeat step 3 for each OLDS in turn until all OLDS have been converted to be encrypted.
- 6. You can delete the old OLDS data sets once you have completed the migration and have confirmed all is operating correctly.



#### **Batch Log Data Sets:**

For new batch jobs, define the batch log data sets with a key label using one of the DFSMS methods for doing so. You cannot change a batch log to be encrypted while a batch job is executing.

#### SLDS/RLDS (IMS archived log data sets):

Update DBRC log archive skeletal JCL to specify either a key label via DSKEYLBL=, or a DATACLAS with an associated key label for the SLDS / RLDS data sets. Alternately, use RACF to associate a key label with your archive log data sets by data set name pattern. Newly-allocated SLDS and RLDS will then be encrypted.

#### Image Copy Data Sets:

Update DBRC image copy skeletal JCL to specify either a key label via DSKEYLBL=, or a DATACLAS with an associated key label for the image copy data sets. Alternately, use RACF to associate a key label with your image copy data sets by data set name pattern. **Change Accumulation Data Sets:** 

Update DBRC change accum skeletal JCL to specify either a key label via DSKEYLBL=, or a DATACLAS with an associated key label for the change accum data sets. Alternately, use RACF to associate a key label with your change accum data sets by data set name pattern.

Note that DFSMS does not support SORT work data sets being encrypted.

#### CQS SRDS Data Sets:


Use IDCAMS to define two new encrypted SRDSs the same size as or larger than the current SRDSs. For the purpose of this example, assume the original SRDSs were named SRDS1 and SRDS2, and the new SRDSs are named SRDS1.NEW and SRDS2.NEW.



## **Encryption IMS**


OSAM dataset support direction

DBAs/System Programmers can enable z Systems hardware encryption for OSAM data without any changes to applications and without experiencing any outage failure.





# **IMS Encryption Flow**




#### Encryption

- IMS application program passes a segment REPL, ISRT, or LOAD request to the IMS control region. IMS uses the DBD to determine that a Segment Edit/Compression exit is required, so IMS loads the exit.
  - 2. Exit invokes ICSF services, passing user-defined data encryption key label (provided by exit) and unencrypted segment.
  - When the segment has been successfully encrypted, the exit passes the segment back to IMS.
  - 4. IMS then puts the encrypted segment into the database



# **IMS Decryption Flow**



#### Decryption

 IMS application program passes segment GET request to IMS control region. IMS determines, from DBD, that a Segment Edit/Compression exit is required, so IMS loads the exit.

2. IMS retrieves encrypted segment from the database.

- IMS then calls the exit and passes it the encrypted segment. The exit invokes ICSF services, which passes the user-defined data encryption key label (provided by exit) and the encrypted segment.
  - 4. When the segment has been successfully decrypted, the exit passes the segment back to IMS.
- 5. IMS passes the decrypted segment back to the application.






# DATA ENCRYPTION USING GDEZ FOR ENCRYPTION FOR IMS AND DB2



# **IMS Supplied Exit Routines**

IMS Exit Routine	Key Encryption
DECENA01	Clear Key
DECENAA1	Clear Key CPACF with Protected Key wrapping Batch CHECKAUTH recurring bypass
DECENB01	CPACF Protected Key
DECENBB1	CPACF Protected Key Batch CHECKAUTH recurring bypass
DECENC01	Secure Key





# InfoSphere GDEz Data Encryption for Db2 and IMS Databases

Using the ISPF interface.

An ISPF dialog is available for you to create customized jobs for encrypting IMS database segments. The ISPF dialog creates customized JCL based on the sample jobs from the previous slide and edited with the information the user supplies.



# Implementation with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

- Implementing IMS Encryption with the Data Encryption Tool
- Generate Key using ICSF KGUP (Key Generation Update Program)
  - Prepare your exit using Data Encryption Tool providing ICSF Keylabel
    - Generate the DBD and ACB(s) to include the COMPRTN value
    - Unload target database
    - Activate the ACB to your IMS systems
      - Include the exit
      - Assure the exit is available in an APF library
    - LOAD the target database
    - /STA database
    - Encryption is now operational



# InfoSphere GDEz Data Encryption – ISPF Main Menu

INFO	SPHERE GUARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI31650
Command ===>	
Select an OPTION t	o continue or END to exit
OPTION	
1	Build an IMS encryption exit
2	Build a DB2 encryption exit
3	Build a job card

Selection 3 for Jobcard creation

#### **IMS** Version 15



# **Database Encryption**

	INFOSPHERE GUARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI31650
Command ===>	
Press ENTER t	o continue or END to exit
	<pre>//DDS0027R JOB USER=&amp;SYSUID, NOTIFY=&amp;SYSUID, MSGCLASS=H, // REGION=0M, TIME=5 //*</pre>

Standard installation Jobcard information



#### InfoSphere GDEz Data Encryption – ISPF Main Menu

INFOS	PHERE GUARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI31650	
Command ===>		
Select an OPTION to continue or END to exit		
OPTION		
1	Build an IMS encryption exit	
2	Build a DB2 encryption exit	
З	Build a job card	

Selection 1 for an IMS Encryption Implementation



#### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

INFOSPHERE GUARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI31650		
Command ===>		
Select an OPTION to continue or END to exit		
OPTION <u>1</u>		
1	Build a standalone encryption IMS exit	
2	Build an IMS compression/encryption exit	

Selections:

- 1 = use to create an encryption exit that will be used standalone; that is without co-existence with a compression routine
- 2 = use to create both an encryption exit and a driver module to call an existing compression routine then the encryption exit



#### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

INFOSPHERE GUARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI31650		
Command ===>		
Press ENTER to continue or END to exit Specify ICSF encryption key to be implemented. Key label		
Key type 1 - IMS SECURE KEY		
2 - IMS CLEAR KEY 3 - IMS CPACF PROTECTED KEY		
Specify encryption JCL parameters. CSF lib		
ZAP lib		
SMP lib IMS Exit lib		
Exit name		

The F1 key provides help information for the screen displayed.



#### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

```
INFOSPHERE GUARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI31650
Help panel
COMMAND ===>
Specify ICSF encryption key to be implemented
 Key label - Enter a key label identifier that the IBM exits will use.
            Key labels are defined using the Integrated Cryptographic
            Service Facility (ICSF) Key Generation Update (KGUP) utility
            and cannot exceed 64 characters in length.
Select which type of IMS exit to be built
Enter 1 IMS SECURE KEY exit DECENC01
     2 IMS DES KEY exit DECENA01
     3 IMS AES CPACF Protected Key (CPK) or non-CPK exit DECENB01
Specify encryption JCL parameters.
 CSF lib - The library containing the ICSF modules :
              CSNBENC , CSNBDEC , CSNBSYE , CSNBSYD and CSNBKRR
ZAP lib
            - The library containing AMASPZAP (load module zap program).
          - The SMP library containing the IBM encryption routines.
 SMP lib
 IMS exit lib - The IMS exit library into which the IMS exit will be linked.
 Exit name - The user specified name of the IMS encryption exit.
```



#### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

INFOSPHERE GUARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI Command ===> Press ENTER to continue or END to exit	The label (name) of the Encryption key that has been previously created by a security administrator
Specify ICSF encryption key to be implemented. Key label <u>ERNIE.CLEAR.DES.128</u>	
Key type <u>2</u> <u>1</u> <u>INS SECURE KEY</u> 2 - IMS CLEAR KEY 3 - IMS CPACF PROTECTED KEY	IMS Clear key selected
Specify encryption JCL parameters.         CSF lib       .         ICSF.SCSFMODO         ZAP lib       .         SMP lib       .         DB2IMSDE.V1R2.SDECLMDO	
IMS Exit lib DDS0027.ENCRYPT.LOADLIB Exit name DSECLEAR	Encryption routine is called DSECLEAR

CSF lib = Installation Encryption services dataset

ZAP lib = Dataset containing AMASPZAP program

SMP lib = Installed GDEz load dataset

EXIT lib = Load dataset for the new Encryption exit

Exit Name = Load module name for the new Encryption exit



### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

EDIT DDS0027.JCLOUT	Columns 0000
Command ===>	Scroll ==
000020 //*******************************	*****
000021 //* Linkedit DES Clear Key encryption routines	into IMS exit DECENA01
000022 //*******************************	*****
000023 //LINK EXEC PGM=IEWL, PARM='LIST, XREF, RENT'	
000024 //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*	
000025 //SYSUDUMP DD SYSOUT=*	
000026 //SDECLMD0 DD DSN=DB2IMSDE.V1R2.SDECLMD0,DISP	P=SHR
000027 //SCSFMOD0 DD DSN=ICSF.SCSFMOD0,DISP=SHR	
000028 //SYSUT1 DD UNIT=SYSALLDA, SPACE=(1024, (50, 5	iO))
000029 //SYSLMOD DD DSN=DDS0027.ENCRYPT.LOADLIB(DSE	CLEAR), DTOD, OUD
000030 //SYSLIN DD *	GDEz supplied Clear
000031 ENTRY DECENA01	Key exit routine
000032 INCLUDE SDECLMD0(DECENA01)	
000033 INCLUDE SCSFMOD0(CSNBSYE)	
000034 INCLUDE SCSFMOD0(CSNBSYD)	Encryption program is called
000035 NAME DSECLEAR(R)	DSECLEAR
000036 /*	

Here is the generated JCL to create the Encryption/Decryption routine link edit. The two ICSF CSNBnnn routines are included and the resulting executable module is place into the dataset DDS0027.ENCRYPT.LOADLIB member DSECLEAR Remember the DDS0027.ENCRYPT. LOADLIB must be in the IMS region's STEPLIB DD or the module must be copied to an existing dataset in the STEPLIB DD



#### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

EDIT DUS0027.JCLOUT Columns 00
000042 //* YOUR ISPF BASIC TARGET LIBRARIES MAY HAVE TO BE ADDED XX37305*
000043 //* TO THE APPROPRIATE "//ISP×LIB" DDNAME CONCATENATIONS, K37305*
000044 //* AND "//ISPTABL" MIGHT HAVE TO BE ADDED POINTING TO PK37305*
000045 /7* THE SAME LIBRARIES AS "//ISPTLIB" PK37305*
000046 //***********************************
000047 //BATCHTSO EXEC PGM=IKJEFT01,DYNAMNBR=25,REGION=0M,COND=EVEN
000048 //SYSLIB DD DISP=SHR, DSN=DDS0027.ENCRYPT.L00DLIP
000049 //** Following library must contain ZAP PGM f Encryption program
000050 //13PEELB DD DI3P-3HK, D3N-3131, EINKEIB
000051 //ISPPLIB DD DISP=SHR, DSN=DB2IMSDE.V1R2.SDEC DSECLEAR to be ZAP'd
000052 //ISPSLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DB2IMSDE.V1R2.SDECSLP
000053 //ISPMLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DB2IMSDE.V1R2.SDECM
000054 // DD DISP=SHR, DSN=ISP.SISPMENU
000055 //ISPTLIB DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DDS0027.ISPF.ISP
000056 //SYSEXEC DD DISP=SHR, DSN=DB2IMSDE.V1R2.
000057 //ISPPROF DD DISP=SHR,DSN=DDS0027.ISPF PROF
000058 //SYSTSPRT DD SYSOUT=*
000059 //ISPLOG DD SYSOUT=*,DCB=(BLKSIZE= <mark>2</mark> ,d,LRECL=80,RECFM=FB)
000060 //SYSTSIN DD *
000061 PROFILE PREFIX (DDS0027)
000062 ISPSTART CMD (%DECENCO2 IMS DSECLEAR - Encryption Key Label being
000063 ERNIE.CLEAR.DES.128 ZAP'd into DSECLEAR
000064 //*

Here is the generated JCL to create the ZAP onto Encryption/Decryption routine. Our Key Label is previously defined and resides in our ICSF dataset. This defined label is ZAP'd onto the routine providing the encryption key to be used. The JCL may need DD concatenations added for your installation's ISPF datasets



### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

INFOSPH	ERE GUARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI31650
Command ===>	
Select an OPTION to c	ontinue or END to exit
OPTION <u>2</u>	
1	Build a standalone encryption IMS exit
2	Build an IMS compression/encryption exit

Now let's try a combination Compression and Encryption implementation.

The Compression and the Encryption routine must be available.



### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

INFOSPHERE G	UARDIUM DATA ENCRYPTION - PI31650		
Command ===>			
Press ENTER to continue or END to exit			
JCL parameters.			
SMP lib	DB2IMSDE.V1R2.SDECLMD0		
Driver exit input New user member name Library Compression exit input	DSEEXIT_ DDS0027.ENCRYPT.LOADLIB		
Member name	DSECOMP DDS0027.ENCRYPT.LOADLIB		
Encryption exit input Member name Library			

Here is the input to create the Link edit job for the combination module. The Driver module will be called DSEEXIT.

It will include a Compression/Decompression routine named DSECOMP. It will include an Encryption/Decryption routine called DSECRYPT. Both of these modules must already exist in the named datasets.



### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

EDIT Command =		Columns 00001 Scroll ===:	
000055 //			
	*****	******	
000057 //* LINKEDIT DRIVER ONLY INTO EXITLIB BEFORE RE-LINKEDIT STEP			
000058 //	<sup>,</sup> ************************************		
000059 //	<pre>'LINK1 EXEC PGM=IEWL,PARM='LIST,XREF,RENT,</pre>	Supplied Driver module for	
000060 //	SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*	Compression & Encryption	
000061 //	/SYSUDUMP DD SYSOUT=*		
000062 //		2	
000063 //			
000064 //	<pre>/SYSLMOD DD DSN=DDS0027.ENCRYPT.LOAD</pre>	=SHR	
000065 //			
000066	INCLUDE SDECLMD0(DECENCDV)		
000067	ENTRY DECENCOV		
000068	NAME DSEEXIT(R)		
000069 /*	K		
000070 //			

The first step of the Link edit job creates the IMS Driver module name in the target load dataset. (SYSLMOD)



#### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

EDIT DDS0027.ENCRYPT.JCL(DSEEXIT) - 01.00	Columns 000
Command ===>	Available Compression routine
000071 //***********************************	Available Compression routine
000072 //* RE-LINKEDIT EXISTING ROUTINES INTO THE EXIT I	
000073 //***********************************	
000074 //LINK2 EXEC PGM=IEWL,PARM='LIST,XREF,RENT,STO	
000075 //SYSPRINT DD SYSOUT=*	
000076 //SYSUDUMP DD SYSOUT=*	
000077 //ENCRYLIB DD DSN=DDS0027.ENCRYPT.LOADLIP	HR
ISP=S DD DSN=DDS0027.ENCRYPT.LOAD	HR Available Encryption
000079 //DRVRLIB DD DSN=DDS0027.ENCRYPT.Lp1_1B,DISP=S	HR routine
000080 //SYSUT1 DD UNIT=SYSDA, SPACE=(12, 4, (50, 50))	Touino
000081 //SYSLMOD DD DSN=DDS0027.ENCRy .LOADLIB,DISP-	
000082 //SYSLIN DD *	
000083 REPLACE COMPEXIT(DSECOMP)	
000084 REPLACE ENCREXIT (DSECRYPT)	
000085 INCLUDE DRVRLIB(DSEEXIT)	
000086 INCLUDE COMPRLIB(DSECOMP)	
000087 PAGE PAGENAME	w Driver medule to
000088 INCLUDE ENCRYLIBIDSECRYPTI	w Driver module to
000089 ENTRY DECENCOV	voke Compression
000090 NAME DSEEXIT(R)	& Encryption
000091 /*	

The second step of the Link edit job includes the named Compression routine and the named Encryption routine to create the composite module named DSEEXIT in the target load dataset.



### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

- IMS DBD update
  - COMPRTN = is added
  - The value of DATA Encrypts only the segment data
  - This value may be entered as KEY to Encrypt any segment field
  - Generate the DBD and the ACB(s)

```
DBD

NAME=F201P4, ACCESS=(HDAM, OSAM), RMNAME=(DFSHDC40, 10, 100)

DSG001 DATASET DD1=F201P41, DEVICE=3380, SIZE=(8192), SCAN=1

*

SEGM NAME=ROOT, BYTES=20, PTR=(TB),

PARENT=0, COMPRTN=(DSEEXIT, DATA, INIT)

FIELD NAME=(ROOTKEY, SEQ, U), BYTES=10, START=1, TYPE=C

FIELD NAME=ROOTFLD1, BYTES=1, START=4, TYPE=C
```

FIELD NAME=ROOTFLD2, BYTES=1, START=5, TYPE=C



### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

- Implementing IMS Encryption with the Data Encryption Tool
- Generate Key using ICSF KGUP (Key Generation Update Program)
- Prepare your exit using Data Encryption Tool providing ICSF Keylabel
- Generate the DBD and ACB(s) to include the COMPRTN value
- Unload target database
- Activate the ACB to your IMS systems
- LOAD the target database
- /STA database
- Encryption is now operational



#### **CLEAR IMS DATA**

	<u>U</u> tilities	<u>C</u> ompilers	<u>H</u> elp			
BROWSE	DDS0027	.F201P4.F20	1P41	Line	e 0000000 Ca	
*****	****	*****	**** Top of Data	. **********	******	
M .						
M.						
M.						
FL.			[ALLY¶			
			IALLY¶			
M .						
		DODOOL INIT	IALLY	3000000001 IN.	LIIALLYq.	
			IALLY¶ IALLY¶			
		900001 TNTT	[ALLY¶			
M .						
			IALLY¶			
			IALLY¶ IALLY¶			
			IALLY¶ IALLY¶			
			IHEET			
M						
M .						
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M .						



### How is crypto Implemented with the Data Encryption Tool for IMS?

- Implementing IMS Encryption with the Data Encryption Tool
- Generate Key using ICSF KGUP (Key Generation Update Program)
  - Prepare your exit using Data Encryption Tool providing ICSF Keylabel
- Generate the DBD and ACB(s) to include the COMPRTN value
  - → Unload target database
- Activate the ACB to your IMS systems
- → LOAD the target database
- 🔿 🚽 /STA database
- Encryption is now operational



#### **ENCRYPTED IMS DATA**

Command ===/	CPOLL ===> <u>PHGE</u>
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
МЕМРТҮ	
МЕМРТҮ	Encryptod data
MEMPTY	Encrypted data
$$ {	
¥	
MEMPIT.	
MEMPIY	
MEMPTY	
МЕМРТУ.	
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¥	
¥	
MEMPTY	
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¥¥	
MEMPTY	
900000001.rQ m1, £4£(¥	
MEMPTY	
MEMPTY	
мемртү	
МЕМРТҮ	
MEMPTY	
MEMPTY	
¥	
МЕМРТҮ	



# **Encryption Implementation Considerations**

- Data Administrator Data Encryption Tool
  - Sets up the EDITPROC and specifies the key to be used for the entire table
     Or
  - Sets up the Segment exit routine
  - Key must be defined to/managed by ICSF (stored in the CKDS)

### Application

- Application logic determines which key to use for each field/column or segment
- Password is managed by the application
- Security requirements
- Performance requirements
- Application/production support
- Space considerations
- Crypto hardware available





## Encryption Algorithms – Which Ones Are Best?

- For more information:
  - TDES NIST Special Publication 800-67 V1 entitled "Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher" and can be found at:
    - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
  - TDES NIST FIPS Publication 197 entitled "Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)" and can be found at:
    - http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf